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The Corona crisis is an unprecedented challenge for societies. Lockdowns and physical 
distancing orders have generated economic, social and health-related consequences in many 
countries. In this regard, we evaluate how information about positive economic expectations 
during the crisis affects citizens’ attitudes. Using a real-world survey experiment, our analyses 
indicate that information about a positive economic outlook and governmental support to 
mitigate the crisis actually promote people’s subjective feelings of disadvantage rather than 
reducing them. Interestingly, it seems that information about economic recovery that opens 
up opportunities may backfire due to increased upward comparisons and perceived 
competition. Structural equation analyses suggest that this relationship is mediated by critical 
views about democratic institutions during the crisis. Citizens lose confidence in their 
governments and democratic decision-makers to uphold principles of fairness after the crisis 
ends. Our results have important implications on how to communicate measures that aim to 
deal with the crisis. 
 







In this article we focus on the impact of optimistic information during the coronavirus crisis 
on citizens’ attitudes. The source of the crisis is ‘severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2’ (SARS-CoV-2), more commonly known as ‘Coronavirus disease’ or ‘COVID-
19’. According to Johns-Hopkins-University, by the end of November 2020 over 60 million 
people had been infected with Coronavirus (Johns Hopkins University, 2020). In March 
2020, many governments took unprecedented measures and enacted lockdowns which 
slowed or stopped economic activity (e.g. closure of restaurants, retail stores and industrial 
plants) to slow the spread of the virus (Flaxman et al. 2020; Haug et al. 2020). These measures 
had a large impact on both the macro economy and individual economic circumstances and 
increased worry about a large-scale recession in the months ahead (Esaiasson et al. 2020; 
Fetzer et al. 2020; Pitas and Ehmer 2020; Schraff 2020).  
This is where our investigation finds its starting point. In this article, we evaluate the 
development of relative deprivation, i.e. subjective feelings of disadvantage during the 
COVID-19 crisis. We aim to ascertain to what extent optimistic information influences the 
‘judgment that one or one’s in-group is disadvantaged compared to a relevant referent’ 
(Pettigrew 2016, 9) during the crisis. For this purpose we conducted a real-world survey 
experiment during the first peak phase of the crisis in Switzerland between 26 March and 6 
April 2020. Respondents were randomly assigned to a treatment condition with an optimistic 
real-world scenario and a control condition. The frame presented a positive outlook on the 
economy (state provisions and future economic recovery). Significantly, the information 
given in the frame stemmed from real-world examples and was not artificially constructed, 
thereby reflecting typical experiences and information during the current crisis (Bechtel et al. 
2015). Consequently, our study is designed to identify the impact of information about 
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positive economic expectations during the crisis on the development of feelings of relative 
deprivation.1  
Our experimental analyses indicate that information about positive economic projections 
during the COVID-19 crisis enhances feelings of group relative deprivation. It seems that 
information about economic recovery that opens up opportunities to move ahead may 
backfire due to increased upward comparison and perceived competition (Smith and Huo 
2014, 231). Moreover, mediation analyses indicate that this positive information might spark 
skepticism towards democratic institutions during the Corona crisis, thereby promoting 
feelings of disadvantage. 
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we offer an analysis of how the COVID-
19 pandemic and its economic consequences affect citizens’ attitudes. For Western Europe 
the pandemic constitutes a dramatic experience with economic and social shutdowns 
unprecedented in modern times. Second, we offer a timely analysis of feelings of 
disadvantage in a society severely affected at the time of the survey. Third, although relative 
deprivation has moved from being a bit player to central stage in social science (Smith et al. 
2012, 203), an imbalance in the evaluation of the concept remains obvious: While a large 
number of studies deal with the consequences of relative deprivation, research into the causes 
continues to lag behind. Thus, scrutinising the impact of information about the economic 
circumstances of the COVID-19 crisis contributes to filling this gap. Moreover, we focus on 
positive expectations during a crisis, adding additional evidence on how crises and their 
consequences affect subjective relative deprivation. Fourth, we use a real-world survey 
experiment and expand our understanding of the effects of issue frames based on real-world 
information, thereby reflecting typical experiences of the current times of crisis (Bechtel et 
al. 2015). In addition, we contribute to the discussion on how political communication which 
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fosters feelings of threat and insecurity influences citizens (Albertson and Gadarian 2015, see 
also Abulof et al., this issue). 
 
Theory and hypotheses: How information about the economic consequences of 
crises impact feelings of disadvantage 
Challenging conventional wisdom about the importance of absolute deprivation, relative 
deprivation ‘occurs when people compare themselves to those who are better off and 
conclude that their disadvantage is undeserved’ (Smith and Huo 2014, 232). Thus, people 
see that somebody is better off and regard this as unfair. In this regard, relative deprivation 
is a subjective impression that one or one’s in-group is disadvantaged. This disadvantage is 
not necessarily objective but is based on a subjective evaluation of the individual that s/he 
deserves more than s/he currently has. It is important to distinguish between individual- and 
group-level relative deprivation (Runciman 1966). Individual-level relative deprivation (IRD) 
means that the comparison is on the individual level, i.e. between an individual and another 
individual or between an individual’s present and past or future situation. Group-level 
relative deprivation (GRD) ‘is an intergroup comparison between an individual’s group and 
another group, or between the group’s current situation and that group’s past or future 
situation’ (Smith and Huo 2014, 233).  
The concept of relative deprivation was originally developed by Stouffer and colleagues as a 
post-hoc explanation in their study about why soldiers in the military police were more 
satisfied than air corpsmen even though the latter had faster promotions than the former 
(Pettigrew 2015; Stouffer et al. 1949). Gurr (1970) then used the concept to investigate 
violent behaviour and (civil) wars. Today it functions as a prominent social science concept 
that has been used to explain a wide variety of outcomes ranging from physical and mental 
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health (Smith and Huo 2014) to individual behaviours such as crime, drug use or academic 
achievement (Smith et al. 2012) to individual and inter-group attitudes such as prejudice and 
nationalism, as well as collective action such as protest participation, extreme right-wing 
voting or violence (Abrams and Grant 2012; Meuleman et al. 2020; Pettigrew et al. 2008; 
Rüdig and Karyotis 2014; Urbanska and Guimond 2018). In comparison, research into the 
causes of relative deprivation is still in its infancy. 
In this article, we argue that information about positive economic expectations during the 
difficult conditions of the COVID-19 crisis impacts the feeling of relative deprivation, i.e. 
feelings of disadvantage. Information is key in the threatening times of crisis. According to 
the affective intelligence model, for example, humans rely on dispositions and heuristics as 
long as no threat is present (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000). New and 
dangerous situations, however, trigger fear and anxiety, which lead people to search for and 
pay greater attention to new information. With the help of the newly acquired information, 
the unfamiliar conditions are assessed and attitudes are formed following either a memory-
based or an online process model. That is, individuals make judgments either based on 
information easily available and retrievable from their memory or right away when the 
information is encountered (Matthes 2007; Scheufele 2000). With respect to the impact of 
information about positive economic expectations during the COVID-19 crisis on subjective 
group relative deprivation among individuals, two competing hypotheses can be formulated. 
On the one hand, following Beck (1992) and Podder (1996) one could argue that in times of 
the pandemic, everybody is exposed to difficult economic conditions. In this regard, in such 
a transboundary crisis all individuals suffer to a certain extent and class differences become 
less important. Under such circumstances there should be no feelings of discontent and 
societies subject themselves to the pursuit of the common goal to overcome the crisis as 
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quickly as possible. Even more so, in such a situation, information on a positive outlook 
could reduce or prevent relative deprivation because the recovery could be seen as an 
opportunity to increase people’s welfare. In addition, optimistic information for future 
developments offers optimism and hope, thereby decreasing feelings of relative deprivation 
(Grofman and Muller 1973). ‘[F]eelings of deprivation or frustration should not just be seen 
as a reaction to objective conditions, but they arise out of the distance between expectations 
and experiences’ (Hooghe et al. 2017, 218). Thus, an optimistic vision for the future should 
decrease the gap between expectations and experiences. Information about policies aiming 
to mitigate the economic crisis may evoke feelings of hope and optimism, thereby decreasing 
feelings of relative deprivation. In sum, we formulate the first hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: Information about positive economic expectations decreases group relative deprivation. 
 
On the other hand, the confrontation with a silver-lining and positive outlook could 
potentially lead to a break with these common interests as self-interest is now the main 
priority. Research has shown that a positive economic outlook does not necessarily imply 
satisfaction (Dambrun et al. 2006; Greitemeyer and Sagioglou 2019; Ishida et al. 2014; Power 
2018). Referring to China, Brockmann et al. (2009) found that despite massive increases in 
income, happiness decreased considerably. Drawing on the concept of relative deprivation, 
they argue that despite personal income increases, the skewed income distribution in China 
implies a ‘worsening [of] most people’s relative position despite absolute gains’ (Brockmann 
et al. 2009, 392; Graham and Pettinato 2002). These so-called ‘frustrated achievers’ feel 
disadvantaged despite having ample resources but their upward comparisons result in relative 
deprivation due to the skewed income distribution (Brockmann et al. 2009; Graham and 
Pettinato 2002). Thus, obvious improvements could inadvertently induce relative deprivation 
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(Smith and Huo 2014, 235). Comparisons with others in particular might prompt relative 
deprivation when people ask why others are even better off (Greitemeyer and Sagioglou 
2019; Smith and Huo 2014). Relative deprivation is prompted by the relative standing of the 
individuals when compared to others and not by his or her absolute position.2  In addition, 
feelings of relative deprivation can also be triggered by crisis-mitigating policies such as 
redistribution that offer opportunities to move to more favourable environments for some 
citizens but might be regarded as status threatening for others. That is, governmental 
interventions can be accompanied by the fear of losing previous advantages or by the 
impression that others are undeservingly treated better (Attewell 2021; Dambrun et al. 2006; 
Grofman and Muller 1973; Guimond and Dambrun 2002). Thus, ‘people may perceive a 
larger discrepancy between their actual (or anticipated) outcomes and the outcomes to which 
they feel entitled’ (Guimond and Dambrun 2002, 902). Altogether, we formulate hypothesis 
2 as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Information about positive economic expectations increases group relative deprivation. 
 
Research design 
In the following section the relationships presented above will be put to an empirical test. 
To understand the effect information about economic expectations during the crisis has on 
the development of relative deprivation, we conducted a survey experiment during the peak 
phase of the crisis in Switzerland between 26 March and 6 April 2020. The data was collected 
by LeeWas GmbH through an online survey with over 1,800 respondents with probability 
sampling in the German-speaking part of Switzerland. Respondents were offered the chance 
to win one of 10 vouchers (valued at 100 CHF) for different online retail shops. The overall 
response rate was 19.4 percent (RR1, The American Association for Public Opinion 
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Research 2016). The mean age in the sample is 49 years which is slightly above the average 
age in Switzerland of around 42 years (Bundesamt für Statistik 2020). Fifty six percent of the 
respondents are female, a little more than the Swiss average (50.4%) (Bundesamt für Statistik 
2020). Regarding education, we encounter the well-known problem of online surveys as 
highly educated individuals are somewhat overrepresented while respondents with below 
secondary education are underrepresented (9% compared to 11%; OECD 2020). In general, 
however, our sample matches the demographics of Switzerland except for the share of the 
respective language regions as we only focus on the German-speaking part of the country. 
All descriptive statistics are presented in table S4 in the supplemental material. Our analysis 
is based on approximately 900 respondents consisting of the experimental condition (N= 
300) and a control condition (N= around 600). 3 
At the time of the survey, Switzerland was one of the COVID-19 hotspots of the first wave 
in Europe with about 1,000 new cases per day (Bundesamt für Gesundheit 2020; Johns 
Hopkins University 2020). The number of infections rose sharply from around 14,000 to 
almost 24,000 between 26 March and 6 April. Moreover, the number of deaths more than 
doubled in this period from 230 to over 700 (Bundesamt für Gesundheit 2020; Johns 
Hopkins University 2020). We chose to conduct the survey only in the German-speaking 
part as we wanted to hold cultural characteristics constant.  
For the survey, respondents were randomly assigned to a treatment or control condition.4 
The experimental condition is a frame that covered information on economic expectations 
during the Corona pandemic. Although the negative expectations are dominant in the current 
situation, one can observe several positive outlooks. Many governments provided financial 




In our treatment condition, we presented a frame that begins with a statement about the 
difficulties the Swiss economy had experienced due to the pandemic. Following that was a 
prognosis from the ‘Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (SECO)’ (State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs) saying that if the epidemiological situation improves Switzerland would experience 
economic growth in the second half of 2020. Moreover, the frame highlights the federal 
measures taken to mitigate the economic consequences, such as a stimulus package of 40 
billion Swiss francs. The frame ends with a statement by the Minister of Economy and 
Finance, Guy Parmelin that the government is ready to help even more and that there are 
already optimistic signs of economic recovery. The rationale behind this frame was to offer 
an optimistic view of the (long-term) economic development and to show that the Swiss 
government has already passed measures to mitigate the consequences and is ready to step 
in more if necessary. This should spark feelings of optimism or hope and thus people should 
perceive the consequences of the pandemic as less severe.  
The information provided in this treatment condition is taken from the website of SECO 
and includes parts of a press release from March 2020. Moreover, the Minister’s statements 
were given to the SRF (public service broadcasting). The information provided to 
respondents is real-world information and not constructed artificially. It reflects typical 
information citizens encounter when reading the newspaper or when watching TV. 
Therefore, we expect that our findings can at least partially be applied to real-world 
relationships outside of our experimental set-up.  
We first performed a manipulation to check on whether our frame had the intended effects, 
i.e. whether respondents who received the positive outlook regarded the consequences of 
the crisis as less severe than those in the control condition. Figure 1 shows the mean for both 
experimental conditions for the question of how severe respondents regard the 
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consequences of the crisis. As expected, respondents receiving the positive frame (M= 4.02, 
SD= .9) were less concerned than those in the control condition (M= 4.22, SD= .81), with 
this difference being significant at the 5-% level. Thus, the difference is around .2 which 
amounts to a quarter of a standard deviation. Given that the frames are based on real-world 
sources at the height of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, we consider this a 
significant difference.  
 
Figure 1 Manipulation check for the treatment 
 
Notes: Bar graph with mean of how severe respondents judge the consequences of the crisis by frame with 95-
% confidence intervals.   
 
Regardless of the treatment condition, all respondents completed a short survey including 
one question on relative deprivation. To measure relative deprivation, people were asked to 
state whether they agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘People like me are 
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systematically disadvantaged, while other groups receive more than they deserve.’5 This item 
is suitable to measure group relative deprivation as it clearly includes a comparison between 
expectation and reality for the individual and his/her in-group. Furthermore, the wording 
implies an unwarranted advantage for the out-group, likely evoking feelings of entitlement 
and deservingness. Both elements are essential characteristics of relative deprivation. The 
formulation of the items signifies that subjective group relative deprivation is an individual-
level phenomenon where individuals see themselves as part of a disadvantaged group. Figure 
A1 in the appendix shows the distribution of the variable. The overall mean is 2.28 on a scale 
from 1 to 5 (where higher values correspond to stronger agreement with the statement 
above).  
To increase the accuracy of our estimates, we used several control variables based on other 
items included in the survey. While the inclusion of these control variables should not affect 
the substantiality of the estimated effects, it increases the precision in the estimation of the 
standard errors (Angrist and Pischke 2009). Additionally, this also allows us to control for 
baseline differences in the covariates. First, we used standard socio-demographic variables 
such as age (squared), sex, education, income, occupation, marital status, and the type of 
community people live in. Socio-economic circumstances (such as income and occupation) 
but also educational attainment play an important role in structuring feelings of relative 
deprivation (Meuleman et al. 2020). We included a question on self-rated health which is an 
important control variable in pandemic times as people who are in worse health are 
particularly vulnerable to the virus and are likely to be especially affected by stay-at-home 
orders and social distancing. We also included a dummy variable for the day respondents 
filled out the survey to account for temporal effects and the time people spent on the 




We conducted linear regression models using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors to 
test our hypotheses. Our dependent variable is group relative deprivation. Our main 
independent variable is a binary variable indicating the respondent’s treatment condition, i.e. 
whether s/he received an experimental frame or the control condition. Our main model 
excluded respondents with response times that were too short to allow for exposure to the 
treatment, i.e. respondents who spent less than five seconds reading the frame. For reasons 
of lucidity, we only presented the coefficients for the frame but the full tables are presented 
in the supplemental material.  
 
Empirical findings 
We started by investigating the effects of our frame on subjective group relative deprivation 
with and without control variables. To ensure that respondents were fully exposed to the 
treatment we excluded the fastest 5% of respondents (less than five seconds exposed to the 
treatment). Figure 2 displays the coefficients of the linear regression models with 90% and 
95% confidence intervals. Referring to the impact of the positive economic frame, our 
analyses indicate a positive effect. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level 
without control variables and significant at the 5% level when including covariates as the 
estimates of standard errors are more precise (Angrist and Pischke 2009). People who read 
about the support measures of the Swiss government and possible economic growth in the 
second half of 2020 felt more relatively deprived than those in the control group. It seems 
that such positive information does not spark optimism but evokes feelings of disadvantage, 
thus supporting hypothesis 2 and rejecting hypothesis 1.  
In terms of size of the effects, we found that for the positive economic frame group, relative 
deprivation is around 2.3 for the control group and around 2.55 for the group that receives 
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the positive frame. This effect is around a fifth of a standard deviation. Considering that we 
used real-world frames and show typical and unexaggerated experiences during the crisis, we 
regard these sizes as substantial. 
Regarding the controls, people with higher incomes feel less relatively deprived than people 
with lower incomes. We find the same for education. People with higher levels of education 
feel less relatively deprived than lesser educated respondents. Young and old respondents 
feel less relatively deprived than middle-aged respondents.  
Figure 2 Regression coefficients of the effect of frames on group relative deprivation 
 
Note: Displayed are linear regression coefficients with 95%(light grey bars) and 90% confidence intervals (dark grey bars). 
Models exclude the fastest 5% respondents. 
 
We conducted several robustness checks to see whether our findings hold for different 
model specifications. In our main model, we restricted the sample based on the time 
respondents spent on the frame to ensure that respondents who were unlikely to have been 
fully exposed to the treatment were excluded (e.g. with response times too short to read the 
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whole frame). As our first robustness check, we estimated an additional model that included 
all respondents irrespective of the time they spent reading the frame. The second additional 
model excluded the fastest and slowest 5%, i.e. respondents who spent less than five or more 
than 59 seconds reading the frame. The third model excluded the fastest 10%, i.e. 
respondents who spent less than seven seconds reading the frame. The fourth model 
excluded the fastest and slowest 10%, i.e. respondents who spent less than seven or more 
than 48 seconds reading the frame. Figure 3 shows that the results remain robust. The 
positive economic frame has a positive effect in every model specification that is significant 
at the 10% level without control variables and at the 5% level with control variables. In the 
following section, we scrutinise the link between positive economic expectations and relative 
deprivation with the help of mediation analyses using structural equation models. 
Figure 3 Regression coefficients of the effect of frames on group relative deprivation with different samples without and with control 
variables 
 





In this section, we analyse the effect of positive information on group relative deprivation in 
more detail. We argue that the positive information presented gives an impression of a new 
beginning, a starting point for a different setting compared to the present situation. During 
a crisis, the various conflicting interests subject themselves to the pursuit of a common goal, 
i.e. overcoming the crisis as quickly as possible. Consequently, everyone pulls in the same 
direction as threats and fear lead to the pursuit of self-interest being put on hold. Yet, being 
confronted with the positive outlook of overcoming the crisis potentially breaks these 
common interests. From now on, self-interest rather than the common good must be 
ensured. Thus, the prospect of a positive development could spark status anxiety or the fear 
of losing out. Furthermore, governmental action to overcome the moment of crisis could 
imply a change in the present rules of the game. Such interventions may include a possible 
redistribution of life chances which threaten one's own status and possibly benefit others 
who do not ‘deserve’ it. Since equal treatment  cannot be guaranteed, people will evaluate 
the democratic system more critically. As the belief in justice, equal treatment and fairness 
of the given institutions might be challenged, feelings of disadvantage arise. In this vein, well-
intended policies to compensate for disadvantages could induce feelings of relative 
deprivation when respondents are afraid that they will not profit from such an improvement 
but others will, although they might not deserve it (Attewell 2021). Lastly, in such a severe 
crisis, people might not believe the positive information provided (Mukhtar 2020). 
Respondents may anticipate policy failures of the political elite as they expect an unfair 
distribution of potential support measures. We propose three different ways to capture this 
evaluative element: Feelings of patriotism, which are defined as a critical love of the country 
and the attachment to its humanistic and democratic values (Blank and Schmidt 2003; 
Sapountzis 2008), trust in the federal government and anti-elitism. 
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Table 1 Results from structural equation models on group-relative deprivation 
 Direct effects Indirect effects 
DV: Group relative deprivation   
   
Constructive Patriotism -.39***  
(.054) 
- 




DV: Constructive Patriotism   
   
Positive economic expectations -.146** 
(.060) 
- 
   
Observations 961 961 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 replications) in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Models 
exclude the fastest 5% respondents. Models are estimated without control variables, but remain the same with controls.  
 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 show the results of structural equation models using patriotism, trust in the 
federal government and anti-elitism as potential mediators that link information about 
positive economic expectations and group relative deprivation (UCLA: Statistical Consulting 
Group).6 The model in Table 1 reveals that reading information about positive expectations 
regarding the economy has an indirect significant effect on relative deprivation (b= .057, SE 
= .023, p <. 05). This effect is mediated by a respondent’s feelings of patriotism. Dissecting 
the effects, reading the positive frame significantly decreases  pride in the democratic rules 
of the game (b= -.146, SE = .060, p < .05). Moreover, patriotism decreases relative 
deprivation (b= -.39, SE = .054, p < .01). Put differently, respondents who read about 
positive economic expectations and governmental actions against the current crisis evaluate 
their country much more critically, which in turn increases their feelings of deprivation. 
When accounting for this mediation, there is no direct significant influence of our treatment 
on relative deprivation (b= .094, SE = .085, p < .270). The mediated effect is around 38 
percent of the total effect (.057/.151 = .38), which is a reasonable amount (UCLA: Statistical 
Consulting Group).  
Table 2 Results from structural equation models on group relative deprivation 
 Direct effects Indirect effects 
DV: Group relative deprivation   
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Trust in federal government  -.28***  
(.038) 
- 




DV: Trust in federal government   
   
Positive economic expectations -.16** 
(.077) 
- 
   
Observations 961 961 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 replications) in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Models 
exclude the fastest 5% respondents. Models are estimated without control variables, but remain the same with controls.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 show the respective results of two further mediation analyses. Respondents 
who read the positive frame are significantly less trusting of the federal government (b= -
.16, SE = .077, p < .05), while trust on the other hand significantly reduces relative 
deprivation (b= -.28, SE = .038, p< .001). The indirect effect of positive expectations on 
relative deprivation is positive and significant (b=.045, SE = .021, p<.05). There is no direct 
significant influence of our treatment on relative deprivation when accounting for this 
mediation (b= .106, SE = .087, p < .22). The mediated effect is around 37% of the total 
effect (.045/.151 = .29), which is slightly smaller than that of patriotism.  
Table 3 Results from structural equation models on group relative deprivation 
 Direct effects Indirect effects 
DV: Group relative deprivation   
   
Anti-elitism  .34***  
(.034) 
- 




DV: Anti-elitism   
   
Positive economic expectations .203** 
(.080) 
- 
   
Observations 961 961 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 replications) in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Models 
exclude the fastest 5% respondents. Models are estimated without control variables, but remain the same with controls.  
 
Lastly, respondents who read the positive frame are significantly more anti-elitist (b= .203, 
SE = .080, p < .05) and anti-elitism significantly increases relative deprivation (b=.34, SE = 
.034, p< .01). The indirect effect of positive expectations on relative deprivation is positive 
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and significant (b=.068, SE = .029, p< .05). Again, there is no direct significant influence of 
our treatment on relative deprivation when accounting for this mediation (b= .083, SE = 
.081, p < .34). The mediated effect is around 45% of the total effect (.068/.151 = .45) which 
is a very reasonable amount.  
To sum up, the mediation analyses shows that information about positive economic 
expectations for the future and large-scale governmental interventions form the picture that 
fairness and democratic norms are undermined. Thus, information demonstrating a positive 
economic outlook might lead to the fact ‘that although people are increasingly able to fulfil 
their material needs, experiencing that others have even more still leads to frustration’ 
(Greitemeyer and Sagioglou 2019, 531). Moreover, linking our findings to the literature on 
populism, we see that being confronted with positive expectations increases anti-elitism, 
which then promotes feelings of subjective relative deprivation. That is, people do not 
believe the positive information they are given and rather think this is propaganda by the 
(political) elite which results in a feeling of disadvantage because the crisis still challenges the 
situation of individuals (Bos et al. 2020). Moreover, information about mitigating policies 
might give people the impression that only the elite and those close to them profit from these 
policies, increasing the representation gap between the people and the elite resulting in an 
increase of relative deprivation.  
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we evaluated the influence of information about positive economic 
expectations in times of the COVID-19 pandemic on subjective relative deprivation. Our 
aim was to confront respondents with a realistic scenario to discover how this information 
affects subjective group relative deprivation. We used information that respondents are likely 
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to encounter in real life, providing realistic cues that affect people’s evaluation of their own 
situation.  
Using an information frame from real-world sources, our analyses indicate that information 
about a positive economic outlook and state provisions induces subjective group relative 
deprivation because people have the impression that others are undeservingly treated better. 
Thus, economic recovery that provides opportunities to move ahead to more advantaged 
settings may backfire due to increased upward comparisons and perceived competition 
(Smith and Huo 2014, 231). In other words: ‘when it becomes obvious that there is enough 
to go around, but despite that, all boats are not being lifted’ (Dorling 2018, 777). To uncover 
potential mechanisms, we performed mediation analyses and found that feelings of 
patriotism, trust in the federal government and anti-elitism potentially mediate the 
relationship between positive expectations and relative deprivation. We argued that when 
confronted with positive expectations and governmental support programs people are more 
critical towards the system and come to the conclusion that they are disadvantaged while 
others are undeservingly treated better. Additionally, citizens lose confidence in their 
governments to uphold principles of fairness after the crisis is overcome. 
Our study offers several important implications for the development of politics and society 
during a crisis. To begin with, we have to realise that feelings of disadvantage are not just a 
phenomenon of difficult times that occur as a response to adverse developments (Meuleman 
et al. 2020). We have shown that relative deprivation can also arise when people are 
confronted with positive outlooks during a crisis. Future growth potential and governmental 
support to mitigate the consequences of the crisis may trigger relative deprivation instead of 
decreasing feelings of disadvantage and subjective inequality. To some extent our findings 
indicate that governments are damned if they do and damned if they don’t. This has 
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important implications for how to communicate measures that aim to deal with the crisis 
(see also Mao, this issue). In this regard, measures to overcome the crisis should account for 
trade-offs and an equal distribution of costs and benefits. Moreover, political actors should 
try to communicate such measures in a way that avoids the perception of unequal distribution 
and unfair disadvantage. It is conceivable that positive economic outlooks during a crisis do 
not necessarily increase social cohesion. In particular, increasing inequality is shown to be a 
driving force of social polarisation and can hamper the development of togetherness (Uslaner 
2010; Uslaner and Brown 2005). In this regard, our findings also link to the literature on 
populism which has recently shown that inequality affects support for populist parties 
(Engler and Weisstanner 2020). Thus, perceived disadvantages are amplified by inequality 
making people more susceptible to populist actors. Moreover, feelings of discontent and 
disadvantage impact emotions, behaviour, and physical health, thus possibly intensifying the 
crisis (Smith and Huo 2014, 232). In addition, research has shown that subjective relative 
deprivation is also linked to radical voting and protest behaviour (Rüdig and Karyotis 2014; 
Urbanska and Guimond 2018).7 This has important implications for the current context, 
especially as support for the countermeasures is decreasing in some countries. Thus, relative 
deprivation could act as an accelerator of potential protests and increasing vote shares for 
radical parties. 
While the COVID-19 crisis has been accompanied by calls for increasing solidarity among  
citizens, it seems that optimistic signs in the economy can induce competition and envy that 
is counter-productive for a society that values solidarity. In addition, social polarisation and 
inequality may also have political ramifications, especially when decision makers try to 
capitalise on the subjective and objective grievances of the public (Urbanska and Guimond 
2018). Our results imply that crisis-hit societies do not necessarily remain a community of 
common destiny but may rather quickly transform into polarised societies. Finally, our 
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preliminary mediation analyses point to the importance of political legitimacy and 
institutional trust in mediating the relationship between information and relative deprivation.  
It has to be noted that our study bears several caveats that must be kept in mind when 
interpreting the results. First, in assessing their situation, people often draw inferences from 
their immediate surroundings. Thus, perceptions of relative deprivation driven by this kind 
of limited information lead to problematic conclusions about disadvantages and discontent 
(Power 2018, 779). Second, as certain limits are imposed on this research design by the 
limited availability of survey data, we can only offer a single measurement for our dependent 
variable – relative deprivation – and cannot test all potential mediators. However, we believe 
that our measurements and the proposed mediation model still offer important insights and 
can be used as a starting point for future research. Third, we used a frame that was intended 
to display information about positive economic expectations during the current crisis. 
Although we could not test the effect of crises directly but rather how information and 
experiences of a crisis affect the feeling of group relative deprivation, we paid great attention 
to employing credible frames portraying real-world information. To that end, our 
information is realistic and respondents are likely to be confronted with such information in 
their normal life during the crisis. This makes it likely that our findings can be transferred 
beyond the experimental set-up. Fourth, we focus only on the German-speaking part of 
Switzerland and it is unclear how our findings relate to other nations. Thus, the general 
problem of how to comparatively approach the present findings beyond the Swiss case 
remains. According to the late Stein Rokkan (1970), however, Switzerland can be thought of 
as a microcosm of Europe because of its cultural, linguistic, religious, and regional diversity. 
Rokkan recommended that anyone wishing to study the dynamics of European politics 
should immerse him or herself in the study of Switzerland. In addition, Switzerland has been 
described as composed of three groups that ‘stand with their backs to each other’ (Steiner 
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2001, 141) In other words, conclusions drawn from empirical analyses in the German-
speaking part of Switzerland are likely to be valid for other German-speaking contexts in 
Europe (Germany and Austria). In addition, regarding the situation of the pandemic in 
Spring 2020, Switzerland had a comparable situation to many Western European countries 
with similar numbers of infections and countermeasures. Lastly, we conducted our 
experiment at the height of the first wave in March and April 2020. When looking at the 
second wave of the pandemic, we can see that the countermeasures are parallel, indicating 
that the social and economic consequences are similar. This suggests our results might still 
be valid in late 2020.  
Altogether, our findings should be viewed as the provisional results of an empirically-
oriented analysis of feelings of disadvantage in times of crises. In this regard, this 
investigation has taken the first step toward greater clarity in this research area and future 
research should use our analyses as a starting point to uncover the mechanism underlying 
the relationship between the course of an existential crisis and group relative deprivation. 
Nevertheless, our study contributes to the understanding of why the end of a crisis and the 
glimmers of hope associated with it could go hand in hand with an emerging polarised 
landscape.  
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1 Positive economic expectations are current perceptions of future economic 
developments that include an improvement in current circumstances 
2 An improvement in an individual’s situation does not necessarily imply a difference in 
relative standing to others. For example, if the situation improves or might improve for 
one individual (or group that an individual identifies with) but somebody else’s situation 
improves more, the (subjective) gap between the first and the second person (or group) 
increases resulting in subjective relative deprivation. 
3 Since our survey covered different facets of the Coronavirus crisis, the full experiment 
included four treatment conditions and one control condition. The conditions were 
randomised and are thus fully independent of each other. In this paper, we focus on the 
condition treating mechanisms related to the positive economic outlook. 
4 We conducted balance tests to see whether the randomisation worked. Only two are 
significant at the 10-% level which is lower than the mean expected value. The table is 
presented in the supplemental material table S2. 
5 In this dataset, we have to limit ourselves to one item to measure group relative 
deprivation. However, factor analysis using an alternative dataset shows that additional 
items measuring relative deprivation load highly on the same factor (see table S3). This 
might remedy the drawbacks of using a single item measurement in this study. 
6 Constructive patriotism is measured with three items that form a single scale.  The exact 
question wording is ‘Could you please state how proud you are of Switzerland in each of 
the following”? (1) Its social security system (2) The way democracy works (3) Its fair 
and equal treatment of all groups in society? Trust in government is measured with the 
question:  How much do you trust the Federal Council? Answers range from 1 ‘do not 
trust at all”  to 5 ‘trust completely”. Anti-elitism is measured by asking the level of 
agreement with the following statement ‘I would rather be represented by a citizen than 
by a specialised politician”. Answers range from 1 ‘strongly disagree” to 5 ‘strongly 
agree”. 
7 In our data, relative deprivation relates positively to voting for the SVP (a conservative, 
right-wing party) and negatively to trust in strangers, albeit very moderately. Yet, the 
results are influenced by our experimental conditions and can thus only give a first 
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